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DEBTORS' RIGHTS EMERGING: A COMPARISON OF SIGNFICANT
PORTIONS OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
WITH EXISTING ILLINOIS LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code' (hereinafter U3C) was drafted and
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and was approved by them and the American Bar Association in 1968.
One of the main features of the U3C is that it purportedly avoids the double
coverage problem which arose with the passage of the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act.2 The single coverage is a strong selling point of the legislation
3
through which the drafters advocate the adoption of U3C to avoid "tinker[ing]
with the hodgepodge of existing state consumer credit legislation."4
More importantly perhaps, the U3C gives the consumer certain rights which
the other piece of legislation attributed to the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, the Uniform Commercial Code,5 either ignored,6
denied, 7 or left to state law to remedy." These rights, the majority of which are
grouped under the rubric "Limitations on Agreements and Practices," 9 will be
compared in this comment with present Illinois law.
Primary concern will be with "consumer credit sale [s],"10 which are defined
by U3C as sales of "goods, services, or an interest in land"" by a commercial
1 Citations herein are to the 1969 Revised Final Draft. Hereinafter the Uniform Con.
sumer Credit Code will be cited as U3C to more readily distinguish it from the Uniform
Commercial Code citation of U.C.C.
2 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., Title I of which is better known as the Truth in Lending
Act. This Act primarily governs those aspects of consumer credit which deal with disclosure,
credit advertising, and garnishment. Unlike other federal legislation, it does not pre-empt
the state law. The Act does not:
annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any creditor from complying with, the laws of any
State ... except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent ... and then only
to the extent of the inconsistency 15 U.S.C. § 1610.
The Act gives the heads of federal agencies such as the Federal Reserve Board or the
Labor Department power to exempt states from the provisions of the Act if they find state
laws to be substantially similar to the Act. Illinois has not been exempted, 35 Fed. Reg.
5215 (1970) but Oklahoma, which adopted U3C in 1969 has been given an exemption as to
all transactions, except 4 minor classes.
3 See generally Dunham, Consumerism, Competition, and Consumer Credit; Action
Now, 57 Ill. Bar J. 718 (1969).
4 U3C Prefatory Note, xxxiii.
5 The Uniform Commercial Code, hereinafter cited as U.C.C.
6 U.C.C. § 3-305; the right of a consumer to assert a defense against a holder in due
course.
7 U.C.C. § 9-504; the right to be free from a deficiency judgment after repossession
of the collateral.
8 U.C.C. § 9-206 provides that an agreement not to assert defenses against the assignee
is enforceable subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule; U.C.C.
§ 9-104 (d), which leaves the subject of wage assignments to state law.
9 U3C art. 2, pt. 4.
10 U3C § 2.104 (1).
11 Id.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
seller to a buyer who is a natural person for an amount not exceeding $25,000
(except in case of land sales), primarily for personal, family, household, or
agricultural purposes. 12 Other types of consumer transactions, such as consumer
leases,' 3 and consumer loans14 will be referred to in passing. First, the law under
U3C shall be stated. Second, existing Illinois law will be discussed, followed by
a comparison or criticism of U3C and how its adoption would change Illinois
law.
II. RIGHT OF THE DEBTOR TO A JUDICIAL HEARING
PRIOR TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
1. Negotiable Instruments Prohibited
Under U3C, a consumer credit seller or lessor may not take a negotiable
instrument, other than a check, as evidence of the obligation. 15 If the seller
does take a negotiable instrument, a holder lacks good faith if he takes the
instrument with notice that it has been taken as a result of a consumer sale or
lease. 16 As a sanction for the taking of a negotiable instrument, the debtor is not
obligated to pay the credit service charge. In addition, he has a right to recover
from the person in violation (or from an assignee of that person's rights who
undertakes direct collection of payments) a penalty in an amount not in excess
of three times the credit service charge.17 However, these sanctions are not avail-
able against a holder in due course,' s who may recover the outstanding debt
from the buyer, including credit service charge. These sanctions seem to be in-
adequate if the instrument is negotiated to a holder in due course: the buyer's
remedies are diminished because of the seller's unlawful taking of an instrument
and probably through no fault of the buyer. Section 5.202 should therefore be
amended to allow the buyer to recover not in excess of four times the credit ser-
vice charge from his original seller, if the buyer's instrument has been negotiated
to a holder in due course.
Under existing Illinois law, the credit seller may take a negotiable instru-
12 U3C § 2.104, comment 1. Excluded generally are 30 day retail charge accounts,
short term credit furnished by professional men and artisans on a one payment basis, as
well as land sales (except as to the provisions on disclosure, U3C § 2.301, and debtor's
remedies, U3C § 5.201) where the credit service charge does not exceed 10% acturarial rate.
13 U3C § 2.106.
14 U3C § 3.104.
15 U3C § 2.304. There is a curious exception to this rule in sales or leases of goods pri-
marily for agricultural purposes. This exception occurs in other sections as well. Reference
shall be made back to this note whenever there is an agricultural exception. It has been
criticized in Spanogle, Advantages and Disadvantages-A Comparison of the Present Maine
Law and the U3C, 22 Maine L. Rev. 295, 314 (1970).
16 U3C § 2.403. Idaho, an adopting state has a non-uniform provision that a consumer
sales note may be taken, but that it must be stamped "consumer paper" which makes it
non-negotiable within the meaning of U.C.C.; ch. 181, § 10, Session Laws Idaho, [19711, 851.
17 U3C § 5.202. In addition he may be liable for a civil penalty for willful violation
under U3C § 6.113.
'8 U3C § 2.403.
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ment,19 and negotiate it to a holder in due course without any sanctions other
than those which inhere in the holder in due course concept. Thus, the adoption
of U3C would bring about the almost complete demise of negotiable consumer
paper.
2. Assignee Subject to Defenses
U3C provides two alternatives for the limitation of the assignee's right to
enforce an agreement not to assert defenses. Alternative A would make the
assignee subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer credit buyer.20 In
no case could this liability exceed the amount owing to the assignee at the time
the claim or defense is asserted. The buyer could not initiate the action against
the assignee, but could only assert the claim as a matter of defense to, or setoff
against, a claim by the assignee.
Under Alternative B21 the assignee may enforce the agreement not to as-
sert defenses only if he:
(1) is not related 22 to the seller; and
(2) acquires the contract in good faith and for value; and
(3) gives the buyer written notice of the assignment, 23 identifying the con-
tract, describing the goods or services, and stating:
(a) the names of the seller and buyer;
(b) the name and address of the assignee;
(c) the amount payable by the buyer; number, amounts, and due
dates of the instalments; and
(d) in conspicuous writing that the buyer has a right to notify the
assignee in writing within three months of any complaints which
the buyer may have against the seller. If such notice is not re-
ceived, the assignee will have a right to enforce the contract free
of any claims that the buyer may have had against the seller; and
(4) receives no notice of complaint within three months of sending the
notice to the buyer.
In Illinois such an agreement may be enforced if the assignee takes for
value, in good faith, and without notice. Even in the absence of a clause, an
agreement arises not to assert defenses, if the buyer signs a security agreement
and a negotiable instrument as part of one transaction. 24 If the buyer has given
a negotiable instrument before he has received the goods, except as to purchases
of automobiles, he may have 5 days following delivery to notify the assignee of
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1211/, § 518 (1969).
20 U3C § 2.204, Alternative A. This is so, agreements to the contrary notwithstanding.
21 U3C § 2.204, Alternative B.
22 See U3C § 1.301 (14).
23 U3C § 2.412 provides that the buyer or lessor may pay the original seller until he
receives notification of assignment, and may in addition request proof of such assignment.
24 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, § 9-206 (1) (1969).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
any claim or right of action, provided that notice of this right is conspicuously
set out in the retail instalment contract.
25
Thus, even the adoption of Alternative B would give the consumer
greater protection without regard to whether the contract was signed before or
after delivery of the goods. Not only would the time period be increased during
which notice may be given to the assignee, but also the notice requirement would
have to be separate and distinct from the signing of the original contract.26
However, neither the U3C 27 nor Illinois law2 8 protects the purchaser of goods
primarily for agricultural purposes in this respect.
3. Confession of Judgment Prohibited
U3C would not authorize any person to confess judgment on a claim arising
out of a consumer credit sale, lease29 or loan.30 The majority of states have
already prohibited these clauses, however, Illinois is in the minority. Confession
of judgment clauses are specifically permitted by statute. 31 The harsh results
are sought to be ameliorated by Supreme Court Rule 276, which allows a judg-
ment obtained by confession to be opened if the motion is accompanied by a
verified answer which discloses a prima facie defense on the merits.32 Of course,
no defenses may exist if the assignee is allowed to enforce an agreement not to
assert them.33 The assignee may also have a negotiable instrument, so that even
without a clause, the debtor would be relegated to the defenses available against
a holder in due course.34 It may be seen that significant abuse and oppression
comes about as a result of use of the confession clause together with other de-
vices designed to give the creditor a short cut way of satisfying the outstanding
obligation. The abolition of the confession of judgment practice would bring
Illinois in line with the majority of states.
4. Assignment of Earnings
U3C makes unenforceable any assignment of earnings for payment of, or
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 12112, § 262 D (1969).
26 Of the adopting states, two have chosen alternative A: H1076, § 2.404, [19711 Laws
of Colorado; Utah Code Annot., § 70B-2.404 (Repl. Vol. 1971). One has chosen alternative
B as it stands: ch. 299, § 2.404, [19711 Session Laws, Idaho, 1150. The rest have chosen
Alternative B with shorter cut-off periods: Ind. Code, Tit. 24, art. 4.5, § 2.404 (1971), 60
days; Okla. Stat. Annot., § 14A 2.204 (Supp. 71-72), 30 days;; ch. 191, § 2.404, [19711
Laws of Wyoming, 301.
U3C has been introduced in the Illinois House HB 2743, and § 2-404 thereof provides
for a 60 day cut-off period.
27 U3C §§ 2.404, Alternatives A and B. See, supra n.15.
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1212, § 502.1 (1969).
29 U3C § 2.415.
30 U3C § 3.407.
8' Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 74, §§ 30, 63 (1969).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 276 (1969).
83 See, supra n.24.
84 IlM. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, § 3-302 (1969).
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as security for, a debt arising out of a consumer credit sale, lease 5 or loan.3 0
The employee may authorize deductions only if such authorization is re-
vocable.
In Illinois an employee may assign 15% 37 of the gross of each wage pay-
ment to pay or secure an "existing debt. '3s Subject to certain disclosure re-
quirements,3 9 the assignment may even be good for two years as to future
employers.40 Under a valid assignment the creditor may make a demand on the
employer if:
(1) the obligation is and has been in default 40 days or more at the time
of the demand;
(2) the employer is shown the assignment and it contains a correct
amount;
(3) 20 days prior to making the demand the creditor has served both em-
ployer and employee with notice of his intention to make a demand ;41
and
(4) the employee has not given notice of a defense to the creditor or the
employer within 20 days after receiving the notice of intention to
make a demand.
42
The enactment of U3C would abolish what is probably the bulk of wage
assignments, but it is not designed to abolish all state law on the subject. Wage
assignments arising out of non-consumer sales, leases, or loans would still be
be allowed.
43
5. Limitations on Garnishment
U3C allows no pre-judgment attachment of earnings if the debt for which
garnishment was sought arose out of a consumer credit sale, lease or loan.
44
35 U3C § 2.410.
36 U3C § 3.403.
37 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 39.4 (1969). Cf. earnings exempt from assignment, and those
exempt from garnishment, n.51 inira.
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 39.1 (2) (1969).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 39.2(a) (1969).
40 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 39.3 (1969).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 39.2 (1969). This provision is modified further by Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 12112, § 2621 (1969), which prohibits communication with employer to collect a
debt, unless debt is 30 days in default, and the employee has been given 5 days prior notice
of intention to communicate with the employer.
42 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 39.4b (1969). If the employer receives notice of a defense
within the 20 day period, he need not pay the creditor, unless he gets a copy of a subsequent
agreement between the creditor and employee authorizing such payment. The employer must
start payments within 5 days of receiving the demand, unless notice of defense is received.
43 These would include assignments to secure land sales where the credit service charge
is under 10% actuarial rate, 30 day retail charge accounts and short term credit furnished
by professional men and artisans on a one payment basis, sales by non-commercial creditors,
and sales for other than consumer purposes.
44 U3C § 5.104. Much like the ban on wage assignments, the limitations on garnish-
ment leave non-consumer credit transactions unaffected. One writer, Clark, Unilorm Con-
sumer Credit Code, Assessing its Impact on One State and Plugging its Loopholes, 18 U.
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After the creditor has obtained a judgment, he may garnish from the debtor's
disposable earnings45 for any work week a sum which exceeds the greater of:
(1) 75% of the disposable earnings for that week; or
(2) 40 times the federal minimum hourly wage, $64. 4"
The employee may not be discharged because his earnings have been subjected
to garnishment "for the purpose of paying a judgment arising from a consumer
credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan."' 47 Sanctions for violation provide
that the employee may recover lost wages not in excess of six weeks and be re-
instated.
48
Illinois law provides that a creditor may not attach wages of the debtor
except pursuant to a court issued "deduction order"49 and only then after he
has become a judgment creditor as a result of "any judgment."50 Earnings ex-
empt from garnishment may be calculated to be the greatest of:
(1) $65 per week of salary, wages, commissions, bonuses, and retirement
or pension payments if the debtor is the head of the family who con-
tributes substantially to its support; or
Kan. L. Rev. 277, 298 (1970) has pointed out that the U3C limitations on garnishment aren't
substantially similar to the requirements of Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq., and therefore should not receive an exemption from the
Secretary of Labor under 15 U.S.C. § 1675. The federal act applies to garnishments arising
out of "any debt" not just those arising out of consumer transactions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1672
(c).
45 U3C § 5.105 (1) (a) defines disposable earnings as those remaining after deductions
required to be withheld by law, or roughly net earnings.
46 U3C § 5.105 (2) (a), (b). The federal minimum hourly wage under 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(a) (1) is $1.60, and therefore $64 would be exempt from garnishment.
47 U3C § 5.106. Again in this respect the U3C is not substantially similar to or stricter
than Subchapter II of the Consumer Protection Act because of the Act's "any debt" coverage,
and the U3C's narrower consumer debt requirement. If an exemption were granted in a
state enacting U3C, an employee could be discharged if his earnings were subjected to
garnishment arising from a 30 day retail charge account on a one payment basis, if the case
was not otherwise regulated by state law. However, if the exemption was not granted, and
there was double coverage, the employee could not be discharged under 15 U.S.C. § 1674,
which subjects the employer to a fine or imprisonment for willful discharge due to garnish-
ment "for any one indebtedness."
If the U3C were left as is, and rightfully no exemption were given from the action of the
federal act, it would still be important for the employer who wants to discharge for more
than any one debt to determine if the debt arose from a consumer transaction or not, for
the employer is subject to a suit for back pay and a reinstatement order under USC
§ 5.202(6). If this is done, a provision should be added that the employer would not be liable
if he discharged the employee under the mistaken belief that the garnishments were not front
consumer debts, if he relied on written statements of the employee for his belief, but was
misled. Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 62, § 73 (1969).
The U3C section on garnishment should not be left as is, but should be made to apply
in its terms to garnishment arising from any debt.
48 U3C § 5.202(6).
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 62, § 71 (1969).
50 Id. A judgment obtained by confession must be confirmed in order for the confessor
to be a "judgment creditor."
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(2) $50 per week of the same sources if debtor is not the head of the
family; or
(3) 85% of the gross wages, salary, commissions and periodic retirement
or pension payments; or
(4) an amount prescribed under 15 U.S.C. § 1673, which provides for
exemption of 75% of weekly earnings after deductions or 30 times
the federal minimum hourly wage, $48.51
Illinois follows the federal act 52 in that it prohibits discharge for "any one
indebtedness.
53
While both Illinois and the U3C prohibit attachment prior to judgment, it
is difficult to determine which gives the employee a greater exemption. U3C
provisions on garnishment are intended to compliment rather than to displace
local garnishment laws,5 4 and hence the comparison must be made with a con-
sumer employee. If the consumer employee is the head of the family, he gets a
slightly greater exemption under the present Illinois law than he would get under
U3C.55 The opposite is true if he is not the head of the family. 5  If deductions
from the consumer employee's wages exceed 10%, he would get a greater exemp-
tion under U3C; but if they do not exceed 10%, he would get greater protection
under Illinois law whether or not he was the head of the family. 57 In any case
the exemption may never be less than that prescribed by the federal act,58 for if
there is a conflict, federal law supercedes state law.59 The U3C would however
give the consumer employee greater protection against discharge due to garnish-
ment than either the Illinois or federal law.60 Garnishment arising from non-
consumer debts would not be affected, unless the U3C section were expanded to
be co-extensive with the federal act.6 '
III. RESTRICTIONS ON COLLATERAL AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
1. Collateral Taken in Single Isolated Consumer Credit Sale
Under U3C, a consumer credit seller may take a security interest in the
property sold,6 2 but the ability of the seller to take a security interest in addi-
tional property of the debtor is severely restricted. The seller may not take a
security interest in other goods or land of the buyer unless the goods or services
sold become closely connected with the additional goods or land in which the
51 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 62, § 73 (1969).
52 15 U.S.C. § 1674.
53 Laws 1971, PA. 77-1636, approved and effective September 24, 1971.
54 U3C § 5.105, Comment 2.
55 $65 exemption under Illinois law, $64 under U3C.
56 $50 exemption under Illinois law, $64 under U3C.
57 Illinois exempts 85% of gross wages, while U3C exempts 75o after deductions.
58 15 U.S.C. § 1673.
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 1610, n.2 supra.
60 U3C bars discharge for garnishment arising from any consumer debt, while federal
and Illinois law bar discharge for garnishment for one indebtedness. This apparently means
that the employee may be discharged by reason of garnishment for 2 or more debts.
61 As suggested in n.47 , supra.
62 U3C § 2.407.
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security interest is taken, and the debt secured is substantial. A security in-
terest in additional goods of the buyer may be taken if:
(1) the goods sold are installed in or affixed to the additional goods; or
the services sold maintain, repair or improve the additional goods in
which the security interest is sought to be taken; and
(2) the debt secured is $300 or more.6 3
The seller of goods or services may take a security interest in land of the buyer
if:
(1) the goods sold are affixed to the land, or the services sold maintain,
repair or improve the land in which the security interest is sought to
be taken; and
(2) the debt secured is $1000 or more.(
4
A consumer credit seller of land65 may take a security interest in the land sold,
but not in additional land or goods of the buyer. 66
The only restrictions on the taking of a security interest in a single isolated
consumer credit sale in Illinois are that any security interest taken must be
clearly described. In a consumer transaction, Illinois law also prohibits the
taking of a security interest in property acquired 10 days after the original
transaction.67
2. Collateral Taken in a Series of Consumer Credit Sales
If there has been a series of consumer credit sales between the same buyer
and seller, there are two ways under U3C by which the seller may take a security
interest in additional goods of the buyer.68 If the seller has an existing security
interest in other property of the buyer (arising from a prior sale) he may secure
the debt arising out of the present sale by taking a security interest in such other
property. 69 He may also take a security interest in the property presently sold
to secure the debt arising out of the prior sale.70 The term applied to this
practice is the taking of cross-collateral.
63 Id. This section does not apply to sales primarily for agricultural purposes. See U3C
§ 2.407, Comment 5 and n.15 supra. For example, a security interest could be taken in the
whole car which was not the subject of the sale if only the motor had been replaced for
$300 or more.
64 U3C § 2.407, Comment 2. A seller of dancing lessons may not take a security interest
in the goods or land of the buyer, but a painter or carpenter who works on the buildings
may if the debt is $1000 or more.
18 One who sells land for personal use and charges an actuarial rate in excess of 10%,
U3C § 2.104(2)b. See generally, Meyers, Real Estate Transactions, Rates and the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 23 Okla. L. Rev. 263 (1970).
66 U3C § 2.407, Comment 3.
67 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 504; ch. 26, § 9-203(1)b; § 9-204(4) (b) (1969).
68 U3C § 2.408.
69 Such other property now secures past and present debts.
70 Seller may as well take a security interest in the property presently sold to secure
the present debt. If he does, the property presently sold would secure past and present debts.
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In Illinois this practice is allowed, 71 but U3C and Illinois differ as to the
time when the cross-collateral security interests may be released. Under U3C
they are released on a first in, first out basis. Normally the total amount of the
debts secured by cross-collateral are consolidated so that the debtor has a single
schedule of instalments in payment of the consolidated debt. Even though this
is done, the creditor must allocate all payments to the first debt incurred, until
that debt is paid off, at which time the security interest terminates. 72 In Illinois,
on the other hand, payments on the consolidated debt are allocated "to all of
the various purchases in the same ratio as the original cash sales prices of the
various purchases bear to the total of all."73 This allows the seller to keep a se-
curity interest in all the goods until the last penny has been paid. There is great
potential for coercion and abuse in this method of release of security interests.
For example, a consumer may have made a long series of purchases and then
defaults with a small amount owing. Nevertheless, the seller may repossess the
entire series of purchases74 even though he may have satisfied the outstanding
obligation by repossessing only one of the purchases.
3. Deficiency Judgments
U3C provides that if the debtor defaults on a debt arising from a consumer
credit sale, the cash price of which was $1000 or less, the seller may not re-
possess all collateral taken, (subject to the restrictions on taking of collateral
as a security interest) and in addition seek a deficiency judgment if the sale of
the collateral does not satisfy the unpaid balance. 75 The seller has an option either
to repossess the goods, or to seek a personal judgment. If he seeks a personal
judgment, the seller may not subject the goods which he could have otherwise
repossessed7 6 to a levy or sale on execution. 77 If the seller repossesses, he need
not sell the collateral if the security interest was taken only in the goods sold.
78
But if the security interest was acquired in additional goods of the buyer, the
71 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121/, § 522 (1969).
72 U3C § 2.409(1).
73 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121%, § 522(2) (1969).
74 This was the case in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), where the court held that a clause allowing the creditor to retain a security in-
terest on all cross-collateral until the entire consolidated debt was paid off, required a hear-
ing as to unconscionability.
75 U3G § 5.103(1), (2). However, the debtor may be liable in addition to the creditor
having repossessed if the debtor has damaged the collateral, or has wrongfully failed to
make the collateral available after default and demand, U3C § 5.103(5).
76 Under a cross-collateral arrangement, the creditor may levy on goods first in if their
price has been paid.
77 U3C § 5.103(6) (b). If the seller seeking a personal judgment could levy on the
collateral, he could avoid the limitations imposed on deficiency judgments.
78 U3C § 5.103(2). This has been criticized in Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and the
UCC-Limitations on Creditors Agreements and Practices, XXXIII Law & Contemp. Prob.
686, 693-94 (1969). The basic problem is that the creditor may receive a windfall if the
debtor defaults after having paid a substantial part of the debt, and the creditor is allowed
to keep the collateral without having to sell it for the debtor's benefit.
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seller must sell the goods if the buyer in default insists.7 9 A security interest in
additional goods of the buyer, as stated before, may be obtained either by the
goods or services sold becoming closely associated with the additional goods,
pursuant to a cross-collateral arrangement, or in a transaction not covered by
the limits on taking of collateral.
Under Illinois law the creditor's remedies are cumulative and the secured
party may "reduce his claim to judgment"' 0 or "proceed without judicial pro-
cess." 8' After repossession he may "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the col-
lateral"' 2 subject to a notice of sale to the debtor (unless special circumstances
are present)8 3 and subject to the debtor's right to redeem before the sale by
paying the unpaid balance.8 4 If the collateral is sold, "It]he secured party must
account to the debtor for any surplus, and .... the debtor is liable for any de-
ficiency." 8 5 If the debtor has paid 60% of the cash price, the creditor must
(unless otherwise agreed) dispose of the collateral within 90 days or suffer a
recovery by the debtor in conversion.8 6 In addition the Retail Installment Sales
Act8 7 provides that if the debtor has paid 60% of the deferred payment price
(a greater amount than under the Uniform Commercial Code) and the buyer
surrenders the goods in good condition to the seller without judicial proceeding,
the seller must elect in 5 days to either (a) retain the goods and release the buyer
from further obligation or (b) return the goods to the debtor at the seller's ex-
pense, and be limited to an action to recover the balance of the indebtedness.
88
In every other case the seller must dispose of the goods unless the debtor fails
to object within 30 days of a written proposal by the seller to retain the goods
in full satisfaction.
8 9
In the situation under the U3C where the repossessing creditor need not
sell the collateral,90 a total reversal is taken from the scheme set up under the
79 U3C § 5.103(3). Comment to this section states that in the case of repossession
of goods which were not the subject of the sale, seller is barred from a deficiency judgment.
However, it goes on to state that the rights of the buyer with respect to compulsory dis-
position of collateral which was not the subject of the sale and the recovery of any surplus
on disposition are defined in U.C.C. §§ 9-504, 9-505. This then means that although the
debtor is not liable for a deficiency, he may recover a surplus in the hands of the debtor,
or force the creditor to dispose of the collateral. This result follows from the comment to
U3C § 1.103, which states:
[i]n the event of conflict between this Act and Article 9 of the UCC the provisions
of this Act control.
80 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-501(1) (1969).
81 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-503 (1969).
82 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-504(1) (1969).
83 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-504(3) (1969).
84 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-506 (1969).
85 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-504(2) (1969).
86 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-505(1) (1969).
87 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 , §§ 501 et seq. (1969).
88 In. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 , § 526 (1969). This does not prevent the creditor from levying
on the returned goods however.
89 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 9-505(2) (1969).
90 See, supra n.78.
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Uniform Commercial Code. A number of questions arise which are unanswered.
First, it is clear that if the seller resells the collateral and does not satisfy the
debt, he may not recover the deficiency from the debtor. If there is a surplus in
the proceeds of the sale, may the buyer recover such a surplus? It could be ar-
gued that he should not, for the creditor need not have resold, and that there is
no requirement that the creditor give notice if he does in fact decide to sell.
Under this analysis Section 5.103(2) seems to be a give and take proposition.
Second, if the creditor repossesses, does the debtor have a right to redeem before
the creditor has disposed of the collateral? 91 As a practical matter the honest
creditor would welcome the opportunity, but what of the case where the debtor
has paid a substantial percentage, and the creditor would be financially better
off by not allowing the debtor to redeem? One writer suggests that the results
might have been unintended by the U3C drafters, and would make repossessed
collateral subject to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, except as to the
creditor's cumulative remedies.9 2 The debtor would then have the right to re-
deem, could recover a surplus, and would be entitled to notice of the resale, as
well as being able to force the creditor to dispose of the property. This latter
right of the debtor may be exercised in such a way as to work an injustice on
the creditor. For example, the debtor may force a resale even where he knows
that the goods are highly depreciated, and that there is no chance of a surplus
from the resale. In such a case, the debtor may be forcing the creditor to take a
loss, secure in the knowledge that he is free from a deficiency judgment. It
seems that making Article 9 applicable is not a panacea and that special rules
must be developed to regulate recovery of surplus, right to redeem, and the
right to force a resale around the concept of no deficiency judgment. The old
rules do not seem to serve the new concept.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of credit has increased in recent years by astronomical proportions,
and it no doubt has the potential of replacing money altogether. With this ex-
pansion it seems that insufficient emphasis has been placed on the differing
policy factors underlying the extension of consumer credit and those underlying
the extension of commercial credit. While the use of negotiable instruments,
cut-off clauses, and cognovit clauses may be desirable and meaningful as be-
tween merchants who understand their implications; when these devices are
transposed to a consumer context, they are an abomination! The U3C serves to
emphasize this distinction, unlike the U.C.C., while leaving purely commercial
transactions free from restrictions.
9 3
91 The debtor has this right under U.C.C. § 9-506.
92 See Clark, Uniform Consumer Credit Code; Assessing Impact on One State and
Plugging Its Loopholes, 18 Kan. L. Rev. 277, 302 (1970). Under this solution repossessed
property would be treated the same whether or not it was the subject of the sale, and there
would be no practical distinction between U3C § 5.103 (2) and (3).
93 U3C covers in limited aspects what it calls "consumer related sales," which en-
compass transactions such as a credit sale by a seller not regularly engaged in similar credit
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The U3C restrictions on agreements and practices will no doubt restrict the
availability of credit. Depriving the lenders and sellers of their unlimited short
cut methods will make them more cautious in extending the credit in the first
place.94 It seems that credit should not be sought to be extended to everyone at
the price of having to suffer summary collection devices and overbearing tactics.
Another alternative, that of consumer education, 95 would have the same effect
on creditors, except that it would make available credit less desirable. Consumer
education should always be emphasized but any practical results from it would
probably be a long time in coming. Adoption of the U3C would have a more
immediate effect on much abused credit practices.
Perhaps most importantly, in addition to giving the consumer substantial
protection from abusive devices, the adoption of the U3C will, with respect to
the provisions herein discussed, dispel the bad light in which the consumer sees
the creditor.
JOHN M. KALNINS
transactions, a credit sale to an individual for business purposes, and a sale to an organi-
zation of a one or two family dwelling occupied by an individual related to the organization.
See Comment 1, U3C § 2.602.
94 This seems to be partially compensated for by U3C provisions allowing creditor free
entry into the market, and by the raising of allowable rates. See generally, Dunham, Con-
sumerism, Competition, and Consumer Credit: Action Now, 57 Ill. Bar J. 718 (1969). It
would be interesting to speculate whether or not states could adopt the U3C with increased
rates if an interest freeze were instituted.
95 U3C § 6.104(1) (c) provides that a consumer credit administrator may establish
programs for education of consumers.
